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Abstract
Even before deep learning architectures became the de facto models for complex
computer vision tasks, the softmax function was, given its elegant properties,
already used to analyze the predictions of feedforward neural networks. Nowadays,
the output of the softmax function is also commonly used to assess the strength
of adversarial examples: malicious data points designed to fail machine learning
models during the testing phase. However, in this paper, we show that it is possible
to generate adversarial examples that take advantage of some properties of the
softmax function, leading to undesired outcomes when interpreting the strength
of the adversarial examples at hand. Specifically, we argue that the output of the
softmax function is a poor indicator when the strength of an adversarial example is
analyzed and that this indicator can be easily tricked by already existing methods
for adversarial example generation.
1 Introduction
Even though deep convolutional neural networks outperform other models on various computer vision
problems such as image classification [8, 17], object detection [14], and segmentation [15], it has
been shown that these models are not foolproof. A recent development called adversarial examples
currently stands as one of the major issues these models are facing [18]. Although there is no clear
definition of an adversarial example, we could call a sample adversarial if it is perturbed to be
misclassified. As new and more optimized attack techniques are engineered on a regular basis, more
complex defense mechanisms are proposed to counter adversarial examples. Nevertheless, assessing
the viability of newly proposed defense mechanisms is not straightforward, attracting substantial
criticism as they are not deemed sufficiently robust against strong adversarial attacks [1, 5]. However,
no clear definition currently exists of what makes an adversarial example strong or weak.
As a consequence of its refined statistical properties, the softmax function is often used to analyze
the prediction of a neural network [3, 11]. In this context, an adversarial example is usually referred
to as strong if it is predicted with high confidence by the model it is generated from and weak if its
confidence is low, where confidence is defined as the probabilistic outcome obtained by using the
values of the logits (i.e., the raw output of the model) as input for the softmax function.
In this paper, we investigate the reliability of the softmax function for evaluating the strength of
adversarial examples, or the lack thereof. We explain why the softmax function leads to poor judgment
when it comes to identifying the strength of adversarial examples, and provide two concrete cases
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(a) Original Image
Prediction: Arctic Fox
Confidence: 0.99
CA1: ∼ 20
CA2: ∼ 5
(b) Adv. Image
Prediction: Radio
Confidence: 1
CA1: ∼ 1e2
CA2: ∼ 10
(c) Adv. Image
Prediction: Radio
Confidence: 1
CA1: ∼ 5e2
CA2: ∼ 12
(d) Adv. Image
Prediction: Radio
Confidence: 1
CA1: ∼ 4e3
CA2: ∼ 40
Figure 1: (a) Original image, predicted as arctic fox with 0.99 confidence. (b)-(c)-(d) Over-optimized
adversarial examples, predicted by ResNet-50 with the same confidence, but with vastly different class
activations. CA1 and CA2 are the class activations of the most and second most likely predictions,
respectively.
with examples from the ImageNet dataset [16]. Finally, we show our observations hold true across
multiple models by presenting detailed experiments on the link between the output (e.g., softmax)
and the transferability of adversarial examples for AlexNet, VGG-16, and ResNet-50 [9, 17, 8].
2 Softmax for Adversarial Examples: Shortcomings and Consequences
When the prediction of a neural network is analyzed, the output is usually represented in terms of
probabilities. To convert logits, hereafter also referred to as class activations (CA), into probabilities,
a normalized exponential function called the softmax function P (u)k =
euk∑M
m=1 e
um
is used, where
u is an input vector such that u = (u1, . . . , uM )T ∈ RM and k is the selected index of the vector
u [2, 7, 3]. In particular, the softmax function uses the exponential function to squeeze the input
values between zero and one in such a way that the output values add up to one. This property makes
the softmax function helpful in more easily interpreting the predictions of a neural network, instead
of having to rely on the class activations, which are more difficult to interpret. The output of the
softmax function is mostly referred to as the confidence of the prediction made.
In reality, the softmax function has two drawbacks for correctly interpreting the predictions of a
neural network when adversarial examples are at stake if it is used in settings with limited decimal
precision. The first one is its lack of a unique input-to-output mapping (in other words, the function
is not injective [6]); the second one is its sensitivity to high-magnitude inputs, which is due to its
reliance on the exponential function. As we will show momentarily, these limitations can mask
certain characteristics of adversarial examples, and could in some cases even be abused by certain
techniques for adversarial example generation.
Over-optimized Adversarial Examples. Multiple methods have been proposed to generate adver-
sarial examples since their discovery by Szegedy et al. [18]. Most of these methods are based on
an iterative approach for optimizing the adversarial examples [10, 4, 12, 18, 13], making it possible
to further optimize an adversarial example (in terms of the logit values), even after obtaining full
confidence. However, once the prediction confidence is mapped to one, it is impossible to differentiate
between the next iterations of the adversarial example based on the softmax output. Indeed, as the
corresponding input (logit) keeps increasing, the softmax output will remain the same, as shown in
Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 2.1. When the softmax function is used in settings with limited decimal precision, it is no
longer sensitive to positive changes in the magnitude of the largest input once the corresponding
output has been mapped to one.
Proof of Lemma 2.1 can be found in Appendix A.
To show a practical outcome of Lemma 2.1 for neural networks, we provide an original image in
Figure 1, classified as arctic fox with 0.99 confidence and three adversarial counterparts, all of which
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(a) Original Image
Prediction: Apple
Confidence: 0.95
CA1: ∼ 19
CA2: ∼ 16
CA3: ∼ 4
(b) Adv. Image
Prediction: Radio
Confidence: 0.75
CA1: ∼ 39
CA2: ∼ 38
CA3: ∼ 7
(c) Adv. Image
Prediction: Radio
Confidence: 0.71
CA1: ∼ 190
CA2: ∼ 189
CA3: ∼ 10
(d) Adv. Image
Prediction: Radio
Confidence: 0.57
CA1: ∼ 523
CA2: ∼ 522
CA3: ∼ 14
Figure 2: (a) Original image, predicted as apple with 0.95 confidence. (b)-(c)-(d) Multi-class
optimized adversarial examples that produce higher class activations, but that are predicted with
lower confidence by ResNet-50. CA1, CA2, and CA3 are the class activations of the first, second,
and third most likely predictions, respectively.
are classified as radio with a confidence values of 1 by a pretrained ResNet-50 [8]. All of the three
adversarial examples have been over-optimized to produce class activations that are beyond the reach
of any natural image, with class activations approximately achieving values of 1e2, 5e2, and 4e3,
respectively. As a comparison, the highest class activation achieved by a genuine image in the whole
Imagenet validation dataset [16] for the pretrained ResNet-50 we use in this experiment is ∼ 52, and
the highest activation for the target class radio is only ∼ 23. As can be observed in Figure 1, when
an adversarial example is referred to as a high-confidence adversarial example based on the output of
the softmax function, both the amount of activation it produces and how far it is optimized are not
clear, given the masking effect of the softmax function.
Multi-class Optimized Adversarial Examples. In order to generate more robust adversarial exam-
ples, multi-class optimization was proposed by Carlini and Wagner [4]. This method aims to produce
an adversarial example that is not only predicted as the targeted class with high confidence, but this
method also optimizes the second most likely class so that the adversarial example can be easily
transferred between models, almost surely being predicted as one of those two classes. In simple
terms, this attack implicitly adds perturbations from two sources: the target class and the second most
likely class. In this case, when the optimization is performed multiple times and the activations of
these two targeted classes become much larger than all other class activations, then the confidence of
the prediction will only depend on these two classes. This attack effectively takes advantage of how
the softmax function maps inputs to outputs to disguise a strong adversarial example as a weak one.
Using this attack, or any other multi-class optimization technique, it is therefore possible to generate
adversarial examples that produce extremely high activations for the selected classes and that are still
disguised as low-confidence adversarial examples.
Lemma 2.2. When the softmax function is used in settings with limited decimal precision, increasing
the input which corresponds to the highest output after softmax function does not result in an increase
in that output when the input of any other non-zero output has a larger increase.
Proof of Lemma 2.2 can be found in Appendix A.
Practical examples for this lemma can be found in Figure 2, showing adversarial examples that
are predicted with lower confidence than their predecessors, although the class activation of the
corresponding input has increased. The prediction confidence of these adversarial examples almost
entirely depends on two out of a thousand classes due to the vast difference among the magnitudes
of the different predictions made. Naturally, since the softmax outputs only depend on two entries,
the lowest confidence that can be achieved for this case is slightly higher than 0.50. However, it is
possible to extend this two-class attack to a larger multi-class attack, producing confidence values
that are even lower, further disguising the adversarial examples when the softmax output is measured.
This again shows that the output of the softmax function may give rise to misleading results when
evaluating the strength of adversarial examples. Note that the results of Lemma 2.2 can easily be
extended to larger multi-class schemes in which more than two classes are optimized.
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(a) Over-optimized Adv. Examples (b) Multi-class Optimized Adv. Examples
Figure 3: Highest class activation and corresponding softmax output as a function of black-box
transferability of adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are generated by VGG-16 and tested
against ResNet-50.
Experimental Results on Transferability of Adversarial Examples. Although there is no perfect
criterion to quantify the strength of an adversarial example, one way to measure it is to analyze
whether or not the adversarial example at hand transfers to other models [5].
To demonstrate the practicality of our previous observations, we present two plots in Figure 3, detailing
the black-box transferability of 2000 adversarial examples, for both the case of (a) over-optimized
and (b) multi-class optimized adversarial examples, with the genuine inceptions of the adversarial
examples taken from the ImageNet validation dataset. Black-box transferability is measured over
the course of adversarial optimization, showing its relation to the highest class activation and its
related softmax output taken from the source model. In particular, the two plots in Figure 3 show
the mean and the corresponding 95% confidence interval of the class activations and the softmax
output of adversarial examples throughout the adversarial optimization as a function of black-box
transferability. The adversarial examples are generated using VGG-16 [17] and their transferability is
tested against ResNet-50 [8].
As can be observed from Figure 3(a), the softmax confidence almost immediately jumps to 100%,
making it from this point onwards impossible to differentiate between consecutive adversarial
examples. Figure 3(b) shows that, in the case of multi-class optimization, the confidence is stuck
at approximately 0.6 throughout the graph, even though the transferability is increasing as the
optimization is continued. Both plots in Figure 3 show that the output of the softmax function is not a
good indicator of the transferability (i.e., the strength) of adversarial examples.
Detailed explanations of the experimental settings and the adversarial example generation methods
used, as well as of further results covering multiple models, can be found in the Appendix B.
3 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
In this paper, we showed that the softmax function is a poor indicator for determining the strength
of adversarial examples. In support of this claim, we discussed two concrete cases: over-optimized
and multi-class optimized adversarial examples. For these two cases, the outcome of the softmax
function leads to misleading interpretations, whereas the class activations, in some cases, provide
solid clues on the strength of the adversarial examples. As it stands, to correctly measure the strength
of adversarial examples, a more reliable method is needed that is sensitive to both the magnitude and
the distribution of the class activations.
Furthermore, all of the previously presented evidence does not only prevent the research community
from correctly determining the strength of adversarial examples when they are used to assess a
proposed defense technique, but the evidence also shows that the softmax function masks how easy
it is to identify the certain types of adversarial examples with high class activations. To that end,
strategically leveraging class activations as a first-line defense may already protect against a high
number of adversarial attacks, even before triggering more complex defense mechanisms.
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Appendix A
This appendix contains the omitted proofs in the main document.
Lemma 2.1. When the softmax function is used in settings with limited decimal precision, it is no
longer sensitive to positive changes in the magnitude of the largest input once the corresponding
output has been mapped to one.
Proof. Take u = (u1, u2, . . . , uM )T ∈ RM with u1 ∈ R+ such that P (u) = (p1, p2, . . . , pM )T ,
p1 > pi ,∀ i ∈ {2, . . . ,M} and assume that the calculation is performed under a limited decimal
precision where the smallest positive number that can be represented is δ, δ ∈ (0, 0.1). Under
these conditions, if p1 > 1− δ, then p1 ≡ 1, and ∀v1 ∈ R+ with v1 > u1, P (v1, u2, . . . , uM )T =
(1, 0, . . . , 0)T .
Lemma 2.2. When the softmax function is used in settings with limited decimal precision, increasing
the input which corresponds to the highest output after softmax function does not result in an increase
in that output when the input of any other non-zero output has a larger increase.
Proof. Take u ∈ RM such that P (u1, u2, . . . , uM )T = (p1, p2, . . . , pM )T , with p1 > pi, ∀ i ∈
{2, . . . ,M} and assume that the calculation is performed under a limited decimal precision where the
smallest positive number that can be represented is δ, δ ∈ (0, 0.1). If pn < δ, n ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M},
then pn ≡ 0, and if pn > 1−δ, then pn ≡ 1. For any t ∈ {2, . . . ,M}with pt > 0, take v ∈ RM such
that vt > v1 > 0, u1+v1 > ut+vt, and vk = 0 for k /∈ {1, t}, then P (u+v)T = (l1, l2, . . . , lM )T ,
with l1 > lt, but l1 < p1.
Appendix B
This appendix briefly discusses the methods used for adversarial example generation, as well as
a number of additional experimental results for measuring black-box transferability of adversarial
examples, and its relation with highest class activation and softmax output.
Notation and Framework
Notation
• X — an image represented as a 3-D tensor (depth × width × height) with integer values in
the range [0, 255].
• y = g(θ,X) — a classification function that links X to a target label, using a neural network
with parameters θ. This neural network does not have a final softmax layer.
• ∇xg(θ,X)c — the partial derivative of a neural network g with respect to X for a target
label c.
Framework
For the experiments on the transferability of adversarial examples, we used three well-known deep
learning architectures: AlexNet, VGG-16, and ResNet-50 [9, 17, 8]. To show that our observations
hold true for a variety of models, we investigated all possible combinations of the three models.
Adversarial Example Generation Methods
In order to be able to generate large number of adversarial examples quickly, we aimed to minimize
the computational cost as much as possible. To achieve this, we used the simplest way to generate
adversarial examples, not paying attention to the perturbation visibility or the L0, L2, or L∞ distances
between the original image and the perturbed one. We would like to make note that when the distance
loss is incorporated into the optimization, the results in terms of class activation and sofmax output
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will not change, but depending on the selected distance metric, the perturbation is added in a
more subtle way at the cost of more computational complexity. The only constraint we set on our
adversarial example generation method was the discretization constraint, which ensured that the
generated adversarial examples were valid images: X ∈ [0, 255]n.
Generating Over-optimized Adversarial Examples
We generated over-optimized adversarial examples using the following equation for the optimization:
Xi+1 = Xi − α∇xg(θ,Xi)c. This attack is similar to proposed iterative attacks such as the basic
iterative method [10] or box-constrained L-BFGS [18] in the sense that it aims to increase the target
likelihood of class c with each iteration. However, instead of using the cross entropy loss, we directly
used the gradients from the model for the sake of speed. For the perturbation multiplier, we used
α = 0.15 to make sure the perturbation itself is reasonable and not extremely large.
Generating Multi-class Optimized Adversarial Examples
To generate multi-class optimized adversarial examples, the following equation was used: Xi+1 =
Xi − α∇xg(θ,Xi)c − β∇xg(θ,Xi)d. This optimization adds perturbations from two sources,
namely the target classes c and d, in order to simultaneously maximize the prediction likelihood
of both classes. This procedure is similar to the Carlini-Wagner Attack [4], however, instead of
holding the difference between likelihood of both optimized classes c and d constant with a complex
constraint (i.e., the parameter k for the loss function in the original paper), we dynamically adjusted
the perturbation multipliers. In order to prevent the prediction from alternating rapidly between both
classes, we lowered the perturbation multipliers as compared to the previous method. We chose
α, β ∈ [0.05, 0.1] and made sure that the multiplier of the less likely prediction class was larger than
the other one. This approach ensured that the prediction did not reach full confidence in terms of
softmax output and always stayed within the range of 0.5 and 1 for either one class or the other.
Experimental Results on the Transferability of Adversarial Examples
Experimental Settings
We first used 2500 images of the ImageNet validation set to generate adversarial examples, making
sure that a selected image is initially correctly predicted by all three models. Using the optimization
techniques presented above, for the two types of adversarial examples under consideration (i.e., over-
optimized and multi-class optimized), we generated 2500 adversarial examples per model, totaling
up to 7500 adversarial examples for each type of adversarial example. These adversarial examples
are optimized for over 500 iterations; after each iteration for a particular adversarial example, we
saved the highest class activation, its corresponding softmax output, and the transferability of that
adversarial example against the other two models. We then processed the collected data using the
following steps:
Data Cleaning. One might think that with enough perturbation an image eventually becomes
adversarial after many iterations. This is, however, not always the case. For certain image-target class
combinations, the optimization may halt, meaning that it may have gotten stuck in a local minimum,
thus making it impossible to further alter the image. To remove these cases from our results, we
filtered out all adversarial examples that did not transfer after 500 iterations. This filtering operation
removed 200 to 500 adversarial examples from the individual model-to-model adversarial example
pool, leaving the results obtained for approximately 2000 adversarial examples to work with.
Data Aggregation. We calculated means and confidence intervals for every optimization step
based on the data retained after the previously explained data cleaning operation. Each step of the
optimization corresponds to a point in the X-axis which is represented as percentage of transferability
(between 0% and 100%) instead of optimization step (between 1 and 500). One might assume that a
subsequent iteration might have less transferability than a previous one (i.e., the (n+ 1)th step has
less transferability than the nth step), impairing the logic for this way of aggregation. However, we
observed that, when an adversarial example is transferred to another model, more often than not, in
the subsequent steps of the optimization, it continued to transfer. Thus, filtering the results based on
transferability provided a decent X-axis, since the transferability started as low as 0% (meaning that
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(a) AlexNet to VGG-16 (b) AlexNet to ResNet-50
(c) VGG-16 to AlexNet (d) VGG-16 to ResNet-50
(e) ResNet-50 to VGG-16 (f) ResNet-50 to AlexNet
Figure 4: Highest class activation and corresponding softmax output as a function of black-box
transferability of over-optimized adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are generated by
AlexNet, VGG-16, or ResNet-50 and tested against each other.
no adversarial example was able to transfer at the beginning) and eventually reached 100% (meaning
that all adversarial examples transferred in the end).
Experimental Results
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the results obtained for over-optimized adversarial examples and multi-
class optimized adversarial examples, respectively, using the previously explained experimental
conditions for AlexNet, VGG-16, and ResNet-50. Given these plots, we can observe the following
results:
• An adversarial example quickly reaches the state of being over-optimized, even with basic
gradient ascent optimization, making the adversarial example generated during the next
step already impossible to differentiate from the previous one when looking at the softmax
output.
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(a) AlexNet to VGG-16 (b) AlexNet to ResNet-50
(c) VGG-16 to AlexNet (d) VGG-16 to ResNet-50
(e) ResNet-50 to AlexNet (f) ResNet-50 to VGG-16
Figure 5: Highest class activation and corresponding softmax output as a function of black-box
transferability of multi-class optimized adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are generated by
AlexNet, VGG-16, or ResNet-50 and tested against each other.
• It is surprisingly easy to mask a strong adversarial example as a weak one based on the
output of the softmax function. The results from Figure 5 show that, in the end, almost all
of the adversarial examples are predicted with less than 100% confidence by the generated
model for the multi-class case, although all of them transferred.
• Compared to the output of the softmax function, class activations provide better clues on
the strength of adversarial examples. However, only relying on class activations is also
not sufficient. Indeed, as for instance shown in Figure 5, the average magnitude of class
activations diminishes quite fast when the optimization targets multiple classes.
• Even though there are differences between the results obtained for each model, the overall
behavior of the softmax output with respect to adversarial transferability is the same for all
three models, showing that our observations hold true, regardless of the selected architecture.
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